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At the beginning of Plato’s Apology Socrates says: καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς 
ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς διδάσκει (20b8-c1). In this text we find the syntactic 
phenomenon known as “oblique optative”, but coordinated with another verb in indicative 
mood. The only coincidence regarding this use of the optative is that the main verb has to be a 
past tense. But there is little coincidence around the semantic reasons for this use of the optative. 
In the present paper we will try to show the specific semantics of the oblique optative and its 
importance for the interpretation of the text. 
 
 
 
At the very beginning of Plato’s Apology, Socrates defends himself from one 
particular accusation: charging for teaching, as if he were a sophist. After a typical 
argument by analogy, Socrates remembers asking Calias, wealthy Athenian who used 
to employ sophists, if there was someone capable of making men good through the 
teaching of political virtue. Calias, Socrates says, answered affirmatively mentioning 
Evenus of Paros. In that moment Socrates says these words, according to Duke-Hicken-
Nicoll-Robinson-Strachan’s edition (1995):1 
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχοι ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς 
διδάσκει (20b8-c1).2 
In this text we find the syntactic phenomenon known as “oblique optative”: in 
the conditional protasis starting with εἰ in 20b9, instead of the indicative mood (or 
subjunctive with ἄν), there are two verbs, one optative and another one indicative, both 
coordinated with καί. The only coincidence between different grammars regarding this 
1  This was also Burnet’s edition both in Burnet, John. Platonis opera. Tomvs I (Oxford 
University Press 1900) and in Burnet, John. Plato’s Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito 
(Clarendon Press 1924). 
2 The codices B, T and W have the optative ἔχοι in 20b9, while the Par. 1810 has the indicative 
ἔχει. On the other hand, in 20c1 we find διδάσκει in codex B and in the Armenian of XIXth. 
century (Arm.), while T, W, P and V have the optative διδάσκοι. 
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use of the optative seems to be the fact that the tense of the main verb has to be 
secondary, i.e. past tense. In our text we have the aorist ἐμακάρισα. But there is little 
coincidence around the semantic reasons for this use of the optative.3 
According to Goodwin (1889), “after past sentences the indicative and the 
optative are in equally good use” (§670).4 This general opinion suggests an equivalence 
between the indicative and the optative in sentences depending on verbs in past tenses. 
Further on in his analysis of the compound sentence, Goodwin specifies a little more 
the semantics of this kind of subordinate sentences: “the principles which govern 
dependent clauses of indirect discourse apply also to all dependent clauses in sentences 
of every kind, if such clauses express indirectly the past thought of any person, even 
that of the speaker himself. This affects the construction only when the leading verb is 
past; then the dependent clause may either take the optative, in the tense in which the 
thought was originally conceived, or retain both the mood and the tense of the direct 
discourse” (§694). Here are some of the examples Goodwin gives, with his own 
translations: 
(i) διδόντος δ᾽ αὐτῷ πάμπολλα δῶρα Τιθραύστου, εἰ ἀπέλθοι ἐκ τῆς χώρας, ἀπεκρίνατο ὁ 
Ἀγησίλαος (Xenophon, Ag. 4.6.1-3). 
When T. offered (to give) him many gifts, if he would go away, Agesilaus answered. 
(ii) Οὐκ ἦν τοῦ πολέμου πέρας οὐδ᾽ ἀπαλλαγὴ Φιλίππῳ, εἰ μὴ Θηβαίους καὶ Θετταλοὺς 
ἐχθροὺς ποιήσειε τῇ πόλει (Demosthenes, Cor. 145.1-3) 
Philip saw that he could neither end nor escape the war unless he should make the Thebans and 
Thessalians hostile to the city. (§696) 
Even when the second translation is rather a paraphrase, it can be seen that in 
both cases the oblique optative is translated according to those who explain its 
semantics as some kind of futurity in the past.5 This being the case, Tithraustus offered 
3 For an exposition of different historical approaches to the oblique optative, cf. Van Rooy, Raf. 
“The relevance of Evidentiality for Ancient Greek: some explorative Steps through Plato” 
(Journal of Greek Linguistics 16, pp. 3-46, 2016) and Lillio, Antonio. “On the oblique optative 
in Herodotus’ completive sentences, an evidentiality mark in Ancient Greek”. In Logozzo, F. 
& Pocetti, P. Ancient Greek Linguistics, (De Gruyter 2017). Pp. 313-335. 
4 Statements of this kind, merely descriptive, without precisions about the semantics of this use 
of the optative mood, are repeated in §§169, 462, 689.II and in Smyth, Herbert Weir. Greek 
Grammar (Harvard University Press 1920: §2176). 
5 V.g. Vigo: “as an interpretative hypothesis, we suggest that the value of the optative in most 
of the cases often included under the name ‘oblique optative’ consists in the expression of a 
futurity relative to the past”, Vigo, Alejandro. “El optativo llamado oblicuo o de 
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multiple gifts in the past, as long as Agesilaus was to leave the location in the future 
(future relative to that past). In the second example, there was neither end nor escape 
from war for Philippus unless he was to make Thebans and Thessalians enemies of the 
city in the future (again, the future relative to that past). 
This interpretation is, no doubt, correct. However, it does not apply to every 
case, being one of them our example in Plato’s Apology. Indeed, it would make little 
sense if Socrates were saying that he considered Evenus blessed if he was going to have 
that art in the future. We know well that that is not what Socrates has in mind. 
Furthermore, even if that was the case, how to explain the indicative διδάσκει next in 
the same subordinate sentence, coordinated with ἔχοι at the same syntactic level? It 
would not make any sense that Socrates considers Evenus blessed because in the future 
he will have an art but, at the same time, considers him blessed because he is teaching 
that same arte... since he does not have it yet! 
If we now go back to Goodwin’s Grammar, we find something more 
interesting: he quotes our text from Plato’s Apology, but with both subordinate verbs in 
indicative mood:6 
καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν Εὔηνον ἐμακάρισα εἰ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἔχει ταύτην τὴν τέχνην καὶ οὕτως ἐμμελῶς 
διδάσκει. 
I congratulated him (told him he was happy), if he really had this art. 
Then we find a marginal note that follows immediately: “here ἔχοι and 
διδάσκοι might be used”. Thereby, the main explanation given supra in §670 –“after 
past sentences the indicative and the optative are in equally good use”– is reaffirmed: 
there seems to be no special difference between both verbal moods. This kind of 
approach, though grammatically correct, neglects the specific semantics of the 
subordinate optative. 
In a similar position as Goodwin’s, Duhoux is a little more specific when he 
says that this optative bears “two modalities expressed by the formations it substitutes: 
the expectation (subjunctive / future indicative / perfect future) and the fact (indicative 
tenses, except future)” (2000: 231).7 Even when semantically richer, this explanation 
subordinación”. In Mascialino, L. & Juliá, V., Guía para el aprendizaje del griego clásico II 
(Baudino 2005: 90; the translation is ours). 
6 He obviously takes the alternative ἔχει in Par. 1810. 
7 The translation is ours. 
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considers the optative a mere “substitution” (substitue) of the expected moods and, by 
doing that, deprives it of a proper sense of its own. Kühner-Gerth say that the oblique 
optative is used to express “past thoughts and speeches”, the original “potential 
semantics” of the optative being “completely obscured” (1963: 254-255)8, reducing its 
semantics merely to the past time situation. After analyzing several approaches to the 
phenomenon, Lillio concludes that “the procedure, in other words, is not readily 
explicable, given that, apparently, it is not subject to any clear rules of distribution 
beyond the dependence on sentences in which the main clause has a historical tense” 
(2017: 315). Lillio’s conclusion is not, however, pessimistic, since it aims to analyze 
each occurrence of these optatives particularly, in order to determine its semantics in 
this or that particular case. This means that, even when grammatically explicable with 
no further problems as dependent of a past tense verb, the subordinate optative is so 
semantically complex that it requires a meticulous analysis in each particular 
occurrence.9 
Humbert’s (1945) explanation adds a very useful aspect. Departing from the 
fact that, even when not obligatory, the use of the oblique optative is not merely optional 
but responds to the need of the speaker to “express the strict relation between two 
propositions” (§202), he says:10 
If the language has been able to express the wills to be made (Indicative) or the eventualities 
actually expected (Subjunctive), it is no less surprising that it has chosen this expression of the 
possible (Optative) when the subordinate seems so committed in the past that excludes all 
reality in the verification or any eventuality in the expectation (§204).11 
We have seen the linguistic possibility of the indicative mood, the subjunctive 
with ἄν, and the optative without ἄν (oblique) in these kind of subordinates sentences. 
Humbert adds the semantics of each alternative: objective verification, expectation 
arised from eventuality and purely hypothetical possibility, respectively. This way of 
interpreting the subordinate optative coincides with those who claim that it expresses 
some doubt of the speaker, in the sense that what he or she says with those optatives is 
8 Quoted by Van Rooy (2016: 34). 
9 This does not mean, of course, that it is impossible to get to general explanations, but only 
that those generalities need to be revised to see how they match each particular context. 
10 Lillio points out the various doubts of the specialists on this subject, concluding that “we 
would, therefore, be dealing with a consecutio modorum used, shall we say, on a discretionary 
basis” (2017: 314). 
11 The translation is ours. 
 Journal of Ancient Philosophy  
ISSN 1981-9471 - FFLCH/USP  
www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga
J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.12, n.1. p. 224-233, 2018. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981-9471.v12i1p224-233
227
something they are not completely sure about, i.e. has some hypothetical aspect. One 
of them is Basset: 
With the oblique optative the speaker interprets also the source of the statement. According to 
our analysis, the speaker marks a point of view that he ascribes to the first utterers, without 
adopting it himself. […] By not adopting the point of view of the utterer, he stands his 
distances.12 
The doubt turns into distance from the original utterers of the information the 
speaker if now bringing from the past. As we can see, the use of the optative gives place 
to a double semantic movement both in time (now the speaker is talking about 
something that took place –allegedly– in the past) and in person (the first person of the 
speaker is distinguished from the third person whose opinions he speaks of, even if that 
third person was himself in the past).13 
Before returning to our text, if we now look at some other oblique optatives in 
the Apology, we can see the semantics of the doubt of the speaker regarding what he is 
saying. 
(i) ἤρετο γὰρ δὴ εἴ τις ἐμοῦ εἴη σοφώτερος (21a5-6). 
He <sc. Chaerephon> certainly asked if there was someone wiser than I. 
The context of the famous question of Chaerephon is clear: Socrates was not 
even aware of the kind of wisdom (σοφία τινά, 20d7) everyone said he had. That is why 
it was not himself who went to Delphi, but Chaerephon, the impetuous (σφοδρός, 21a3), 
who had the courage (ἐτόλμησε, 21a4) to make the question. The meaning of the 
optative without ἄν is not the possibility (“asked if there could be someone wiser than 
I”), but the hesitation of the speaker (Socrates) regarding not only the question of the 
12 Basset, Louis. “L’ optatif grec et la dissociation enonciative”. (Lalies 4, 1984, p. 16); the 
translation is ours. Cf. also Fontoynont, Victor. Vocabulario griego comentado y basado en 
textos, (spanish version of L. Ribot Armendia, Santander, Sal Terrae 1944: p. 31). Mendez 
Dosuna, Julián. “Le valeur de l’optatif oblique grec. Un regard fonctionnel-typologique”. In 
Bernard Jacquinod (ed.), Les complétives en grec ancien: Actes du colloque international de 
Saint-Etienne (3–5 septembre 1998), pp. 331-352 (Publications de l’ Université de Saint-
Étienne 1999) and Faure, Richard. “The Oblique Optative, a Case of Narrative Tense: The 
Example of the Future Optative”. In Annamaria Bartolotta (ed.), The Greek Verb. Morphology, 
Syntax, Semantics. Proceedings of the 8th International Meeting of Greek Linguistics. 
Agrigento, October 1–2, 2009, pp. 131-148 (Peeters 2014) follow Basset in this matter. 
13 This is what Basset, Louis. “La représentation subjective d’un point de vue passé: L’optatif 
oblique dans les complétives déclaratives chez Thucydide”. In S. Rémi-Giraud and M. Le 
Guern (eds.), Sur le verbe, pp. 91-111, (Presses Universitaires de Lyon 1986: p. 111) calls 
“escape from nynegocentrism” (νῦν and ἐγώ). 
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utterer (Chaerephon), but also the answer of the oracle: καὶ πολὺν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν 
τί ποτε λέγει (“and for a long time I was at loss as to what he <sc. the oracle> meant”, 
21b7). 
(ii) ἔδοξέ μοι οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖν μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς ἄλλοις τε πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ μάλιστα 
ἑαυτῷ, εἶναι δ᾽ οὔ· κἄπειτα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύναι ὅτι οἴοιτο μὲν εἶναι σοφός, εἴη δ᾽ οὔ 
(21c5-8). 
It seemed to me that that man seemed to be wise to many other men and specially for himself, 
but was not. Then I tried to show him that he believed to be wise, but was not. 
In this text we find two opinions involved: the one of the speaker (μοι) and 
that of the person he is trying to prove wrong (αὐτῷ). It is clear that the speaker does 
not share his opinion with the person to whom he refers. The optative mood is used to 
show this difference in a subtle way, without having to say so explicitly.14 Thus, we 
find again the semantics of the doubt of the speaker in relation to the things he says 
and, as a consequence, the distance from his own words referring the opinion of others. 
Indeed, this seems to be an important restriction on the use of the oblique optative: “this 
mood can only be used when the contents of the proposition are represented from the 
point of view of the protagonist as particular to someone else or to himself in a different 
(i.e. past) situation”.15 
(iii) ἔγνων οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ 
φύσει τινὶ καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες ὥσπερ οἱ θεομάντεις καὶ οἱ χρησμῳδοί (22b8-c2). 
Hence, also in the case of the poets I recognized this in a short time: that they did not composed 
what they composed by wisdom, but by certain nature and inspired, just like prophets and oracle 
givers. 
According to Socrates, poets do not have knowledge of what they do –meaning 
there is no poetic technique– but do it only because of some kind of natural condition, 
inspired and out of reason. That is why he is not completely sure about their supposed 
action of “composing” (ποιεῖν). We see again two opinions faced to each other: the 
poets claimed they compose by wisdom; Socrates knew (ἔγνων) they did not.16 
Let us now go back to our text from the Apology and its two verbs in different 
moods coordinated. We can say that Socrates is not completely sure that Evenus 
14 This would have been impossible with the indicative and the subjunctive, since they convey 
commonly accepted views. 
15 Van Rooy (2016: 36). Cf. Basset (1984). 
16 Cf. other oblique optatives with this semantics in 22a6-8, 22b2-5, 22c9-d2, 22e4-5, 32c4-8, 
40a4-6. 
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actually had the art of teaching political virtue (something reaffirmed by the adverbial 
expression ὡς ἀληθῶς), but was indeed sure that he pretended to teach it and charge for 
it, even a modest amount. Just as we saw supra, we have here two different opinions: 
Calias says that Evenus had the art of the πολιτικὴ ἀρετή and that he taught it for money. 
Socrates, on the other hand, is not completely sure that he had that τέχνη, but agrees 
with Calias that he taught it for money. Hence the optative ἔχοι and the indicative 
διδάσκει, respectively. The use of the oblique optative is here possible since we are in 
a situation where the speaker is quoting an opinion he does not agree with. The richness 
of this example relies in the fact that we can see two moods working together, in the 
same sentence and coordinated with καί: both the semantics of the doubt-distance 
(optative) and that of the commonly accepted views (indicative).17 
But there one last interesting way of analyzing the semantics of the oblique 
optative in our text: by checking the sentences that come immediately after. 
ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἂν εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ 
ἐπίσταμαι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι (20c1-3). 
I myself would be certainly proud and put on airs if I had understood those things. But I 
certanily do not understand <them>, men of Athens. 
The first sentence has a protasis with and indicative imperfect tense without 
ἄν and an apodosis with indicative imperfect tenses with ἄν, meaning that Socrates 
builds an unreal scenario in which he may have had such a knowledge. Since he never 
had it, the scenario is completely unreal. There is no doubt or distance, nor possibility 
or eventuality. In the second sentence, the reality of the indicative mood closes the 
modal arch: Socrates certainly does not know any kind of art regarding politics. These 
sentences illuminate the semantics of the oblique optative immediately before: Plato 
did not mean unreality nor possibility, but doubt and distance of the speaker from what 
he is saying. 
If we now look at some published translations of the text, we may see that 
some of them do not convey this semantic subtlety: 
Happy is Evenus, I said to myself, if he really has this wisdom, and teaches at such a moderate 
charge (Jowett, 1892). 
17 Basset (1984: 14 ff.) finds the original use of the oblique optative in Homer (even when there 
is not subordination, but paratáxis) with the main semantics of irony. Perhaps some remnant of 
such Homeric origins has lasted until Plato's attic, giving Socrates’ words that ironic shade that 
he liked so much. 
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I thought Evenus a happy man, if he really possesses this art, and teaches for so moderate a fee 
(Grube, 2002). 
And I regarded Evenus as blessed if he should truly have this art and teaches at such a modest 
rate (Leibowitz, 2010). 
And I thought Evenus was lucky if he really did have such skill and teaches for such a modest 
sum (Emlyn-Jones & Preddy, 2017) 
Et moi de considérer qu’Événos était vraiment un homme heureux, à supposer qu’il possédât 
réelment cet art et qu’il pût l’enseigner à des conditions si mesurées (Brisson, 2005). 
Y yo consideré dichoso a Eveno, si realmente poseía tal arte y lo enseñaba tan atinadamente 
(Vigo, 1997). 
Y yo consideré feliz a Eveno, si verdaderamente posee ese arte y enseña tan convenientemente 
(Calonge, 1997). 
Jowett and Grube do not make any difference between the two verbs, as if they 
were just indicatives in present tense.18 Something similar happens in Brisson’s, Vigo’s 
and Calonge’s translations. In their recent translation Emlyn-Jones & Preddy translate 
ἔχοι in past tense and διδάσκει in present, showing no more than a time difference 
between the two of them but missing the semantics of the mood. Thus, the speaker 
escapes from his time, but not from himself, i.e. does not separate his own opinion from 
the opinion he is bringing from the past. 
In our opinion, Leibowitz finds the most accurate translation by adding the 
modalizer “should” to the optative. Our own proposal could consist in adding “should” 
or, maybe, a stronger modal indication to emphasize the difference between the two 
moods. It could be something like this: 
And I considered Evenus blessed if he truly kind of had that art and taught it for such a modest 
number. 
Even when we can look for better and tighter translations, the truth is that these 
uses of the oblique optative seem to be difficult to translate without having to resort to 
periphrasis or even paraphrases. But beyond that, the real importance of this 
phaenomenon relies not so much on the way we translate them, but on how it 
contributes particularly to the proper understanding of each text in which it appears. 
 
 
Esteban Bieda 
University of Buenos Aires - CONICET 
18 We should remember that the Par. 1810 has ἔχει, instead of ἔχοι. 
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